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Abstract. - The success of imitation as an evolutionary driving force in spatial games has of-
ten been questioned, especially for social dilemmas such as the snowdrift game, where the most
profitable may be the mixed phase sustaining both the cooperative as well as the defective strat-
egy. Here we reexamine this assumption by investigating the evolution of cooperation in spatial
social dilemma games, where instead of pure strategies players can adopt emotional profiles of
their neighbors. For simplicity, the emotional profile of each player is determined by two pivotal
factors only, namely how it behaves towards less and how towards more successful neighbors.
We find that imitating emotions such as goodwill and envy instead of pure strategies from the
more successful players reestablishes imitation as a tour de force for resolving social dilemmas on
structured populations without any additional assumptions or strategic complexity.
Introduction. – Societies facing a social dilemma are
at risk of failing to uphold wellbeing in their ranks because
there exist strong incentives to put success of individuals
above that of the society as a whole. It is therefore in
the best, although not completely obvious, interest of all
if social dilemmas are mitigated or, if at all possible, alto-
gether avoided. Cooperative behavior [1] is something of a
holly grail when it comes to resolving social dilemmas. To
cooperate traditionally means to sacrifice some fraction of
personal benefits for elevating social welfare. However, in
the face of natural selection, favoring the fittest and the
strongest amongst us, the concept quickly becomes misty
and the outlook for cooperators to survive murky. Enter
evolutionary games [2–4], which are frequently employed
to help us reveal and understand the mechanisms and rea-
sons why cooperation nevertheless prevails and is in fact
much more common than one could assume. Examples of
recent research works aimed towards this direction include
[5–18].
One of the most rewarding observations in recent history
related to the resolution of social dilemmas was that spa-
tial reciprocity can maintain cooperative behavior with-
out additional assumptions or mechanism weighing down
on defectors [19]. Other well known mechanisms promot-
ing cooperation include kin selection [20], direct and in-
direct reciprocity [21], as well as group [22] and multi-
level selection [23,24]. These as well as related mechanism
for the promotion of cooperation have been comprehen-
sively reviewed in [25], and there are a number of recent
reviews devoted to evolutionary games that capture suc-
cinctly recent advances made along this very vibrant av-
enue of research [26–29]. Focusing on spatial reciprocity,
however, one finds that certain social dilemmas are not
susceptible to its workings, and that indeed well-mixed
conditions may represent a more favorable environment.
Hauert and Doebeli [30] reported that, especially for the
snowdrift game, the promotion of cooperation by means
of imitation on structured populations is problematic be-
cause the Nash equilibrium is a mixed phase of cooperators
and defectors. Consequently, it is advantageous to imi-
tate strategies that are opposite to neighboring strategies,
which ultimately leads to a failure of utilizing advantages
of spatial reciprocity. Moreover, while some experimental
findings question the importance of imitation [31], others
find that humans may imitate even in situations that may
decrease their chance of further success [32], suggesting
that such seemingly maladaptive behavior may be due to
the inherent evolutionary usefulness of imitation in other
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situations.
Here we study the evolution of cooperation in spatial
social dilemma games, but departing from the traditional
assumption that strategies of players are the ones to po-
tentially be imitated. Although it is certainly reasonable
to assume that if one strategy is performing good imitat-
ing it is bound to yield positive results, we caution that
this may not always be the case. Indeed, it is easy to come
up with many such examples, the most obvious one being
that imitating defection from a player that is surrounded
by cooperators is a very bad idea if oneself is surrounded
by defectors. Of course this scenario is more or less likely
depending on the overlap between the neighborhoods of
the two players, and may be more applicable to human
societies than a grouping of simple microorganisms, yet
it nevertheless is motivating enough for us to reconsider
the concept of imitation. In particular, we refine it by al-
lowing players not simply to imitate pure strategies, but
rather to imitate emotional profiles of each other. In order
to keep the model simple but still capturing the most rele-
vant new features, we assign to every player two properties
that define its emotional profile, namely the probability to
cooperate with a more successful neighbor and the prob-
ability to cooperate with a less successful neighbor. With
the first we determine envy or spite, while with the second
property we determine goodwill or charity of each individ-
ual. In this way the strategy becomes link-specific rather
than player-specific, as is the case in the traditional model.
Obviously, other interpretations of the two probabilities
are possible as well. Interestingly, we find that, without
any additional assumptions, by imitating the more suc-
cessful emotional profiles instead of simply the more suc-
cessful strategies, the evolution of cooperation is signifi-
cantly promoted and substantially higher social welfare is
attainable, even in games where the most favorable is the
mixed strategy phase. Thus, a simple fine tuning of the
concept of imitation, or rather of what is possible to imi-
tate, reestablishes imitation as an important and globally
beneficial behavior in evolutionary processes.
The remainder of this letter is organized as follows.
First, we describe the considered social dilemmas and the
protocol for the imitation of emotional profiles. Next we
present the results, whereas lastly we summarize and dis-
cuss their implications.
Social dilemmas and emotional profiles. – As-
suming that mutual cooperation yields the reward R, mu-
tual defection leads to punishment P , and the mixed
choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and the
defector the temptation T , we have the prisoner’s dilemma
game if T > R > P > S, the snowdrift game if T > R >
S > P , and the stag-hunt game if R > T > P > S, thus
covering all three major social dilemma types where play-
ers can choose between cooperation and defection. Fol-
lowing common practice, we set R = 1 and P = 0, thus
leaving the remaining two payoffs to occupy −1 ≤ S ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2, as depicted schematically in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1: Schematic presentation of the two-dimensional T − S
parameter plane encompassing the stag-hunt (SH), the pris-
oner’s dilemma (PD) and the snowdrift (SD) game. The upper
left quadrant represents the so-called harmony game (HG), yet
the latter does not constitute a social dilemma because there
cooperation is always the winning strategy. The color mapping
depicts the stationary fraction of cooperators ρC as obtained
if the evolutionary process is governed by strategy imitation.
See also the main text for details.
In the traditional model, irrespective of the governing
social dilemma, each player x occupies a node on the L×L
square lattice and is initially designated either as a cooper-
ator (sx = C) or defector (sx = D) with equal probability,
while evolution of the two strategies is performed in ac-
cordance with the Monte Carlo simulation procedure com-
prising the following elementary steps. First, a randomly
selected player x acquires its payoff px by playing the game
with all its four neighbors. Next, one randomly chosen
neighbor of x, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff py by
playing the game with all its four neighbors. Tradition-
ally player y then imitates the strategy of player x with the
probability q = 1/{1+ exp[(py − px)/K]}, where K deter-
mines the level of uncertainty by strategy adoptions [33],
which can be attributed to errors in judgment due to mis-
takes and external influences that affect the evaluation of
the opponent. Without loss of generality we set K = 0.5,
implying that better performing players are readily imi-
tated, but it is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a
player performing worse. This value of K is representative
for a wide range of finite selection intensities. The weak-
selection limit [34–36] (K → ∞), however, is not studied
in the present work. For this traditional setup the sta-
tionary fraction of cooperators ρC in the T −S parameter
plane is as depicted in Fig. 1. Well known results include
the widespread dominance of defectors in the prisoner’s
dilemma quadrant, as well as the possibility of coopera-
tor dominance and coexistence with the defectors in the
snowdrift and the stag-hung quadrant, yet only for suffi-
ciently favorable combinations of T and S. These results
will primarily be used for comparison purposes with the
main findings that will be presented in the next section.
In order to depart from the traditional setup of spatial
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social dilemma games summarized above, we introduce an
emotional profile to each player x, which is determined
by the parameter pair (αx, βx) ∈ [0.1]. Here αx is the
probability that player x will cooperate with player y if
px ≥ py, while βx is the probability that player x will
cooperate with player y if px < py. Essentially thus, the
two parameters determine how a given player will behave
when facing more or a less successful opponent. Initially,
to enable the start of the evaluation process, each player is
assigned a random (α, β) pair and a payoff from the reach-
able [4S, 4T ] interval. Subsequently, every payoff value
is updated by considering the proper neighborhoods of a
player and the actual emotional parameters. Importantly,
after the accumulation of new payoffs, player y does not
imitate the strategy of player x with the previously estab-
lished adoption probability q, but rather its emotional pro-
file, i.e. the αx and/or βx value. Such a profile implicitly
allows a player to behave differently (to cooperate and/or
defect) towards different neighbors at the same time. Since
the emotional profile consist of two parameters, however,
the imitation is done separately for the two to avoid poten-
tial artificial propagation of freak (extremely successful)
(αx, βx) pairs. Naturally, the same probability q is ap-
plied for both imitations. Finally, after each imitation the
payoff of player y is updated using its new emotional pro-
file, whereby each full Monte Carlo step involves all players
having a chance to adopt the emotional profile from one of
their neighbors once on average. Prior to presenting the
result of this model, it is important to note that there will
always be a fixation of (αx, βx) pairs, i.e. irrespective of T
and S only a single pair will eventually spread across the
whole population. Naturally, the fixation time depends on
the system size as well as game parametrization, which we
have taken properly into account by sufficiently long sim-
ulations times prior to recording the final α and β value.
It is also worth pointing out that once the fixation occurs,
the evolutionary process stops. The characteristic proba-
bility of encountering cooperative behavior on the spatial
grid, which is equivalent to the stationary fraction of co-
operators in the traditional version of the game, can thus
be determined by means of averaging over the final states
that emerge from different initial conditions.
Results. – We start by presenting the color map en-
coding the final values of α on the T −S parameter plane
in Fig. 2. Since α is the probability that players will co-
operate with their less successful neighbors, i.e. despite
the fact that their payoff is lower, this can be interpreted
either as goodwill or charity. From the presented results
it follows that for the snowdrift quadrant this behavior
is practically completely dominant, irrespective of the de-
tails of game parametrization. Thus, if the governing so-
cial dilemma is of the snowdrift type, then players will
always (α = 1) cooperate with their neighbors provided
their payoff is lower. For the stag-hunt game, on the other
hand, the region of α = 1 corresponds roughly to the
region of cooperator dominance in the traditional model
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Fig. 2: Color map depicting the final values of α on the T − S
parameter plane. Interpreting the probability to cooperate
with less successful neighbors as goodwill or charity, it can be
concluded that this emerges spontaneously for all three consid-
ered social dilemmas in at least some regions of the considered
T − S plane. Especially for the snowdrift quadrant (compare
with Fig. 1) the “dominance” of α = 1 is quite remarkable.
(compare with results presented in Fig. 1), although it ex-
tends somewhat further towards smaller S and larger T
values. Results in the lower right quadrant, correspond-
ing to the prisoner’s dilemma game, are equally positive,
indicating that as long as S is not too low, cooperation
with less successful neighbors will be the dominant be-
havior. This holds virtually independent of T , although
surprisingly as T increases the minimal S still warranting
α = 1 decreases. It can thus be concluded that raising the
temptation to defect may even facilitate charitable actions
in that they are upheld even by lower values of S.
Since the final values of α reveal only half of the behav-
ior on the spatial gird, it is next of interest to examine
the color map encoding the final values of β on the T − S
parameter plane. Results presented in Fig. 3 reveal at a
glance that it is significantly more difficult to achieve co-
operation with more successful neighbors than vice versa
(compare with results presented in Fig. 2). While the re-
sults for the stag-hung game for β are practically identical
to those for α, the situation is much different for the snow-
drift and the prisoner’s dilemma game. In the snowdrift
quadrant the total dominance of α = 1 is replaced by near
complete dominance of β = 0, indicating that players will
not cooperate with their neighbors if the later are more
successful. Envy thus appears to be an important agonist
for the evolution of defection, rather than cooperation, in
the snowdrift game. Only for values of T slightly above 1,
and irrespective of S, will players choose to cooperate with
their more successful neighbors, but otherwise not. For
the prisoner’s dilemma game the results are equally nega-
tive, further restricting cooperation with more successful
neighbors not only to small values of T , but also only to
moderately negative values of S. As we will reveal below,
however, unwillingness to cooperate with the more suc-
cessful neighbors has negative consequences mainly for the
p-3
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Fig. 3: Color map depicting the final values of β on the T − S
parameter plane. Interpreting the probability to cooperate
with more successful neighbors as being representative for envy
or spite, it can be concluded that this represent a serious im-
pediment for the evolution of cooperation, especially for the
snowdrift and the prisoner’s dilemma game. There players will
not cooperate with their neighbors if the latter are more suc-
cessful than themselves. Conversely, in the stag-hunt game the
payoff of neighbors, if compared to that of the player deciding
either to cooperate or to defect, will play no role. Compare
with results presented in Fig. 2.
evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game,
while for the snowdrift game this fact actually favors the
emergence of the globally optimal mixed phase warranting
the highest level of social welfare.
By considering the results presented in Figs. 2 and 3
combined, we arrive at the probability to encounter coop-
erative behavior on the spatial grid, as depicted in Fig. 4.
Here ρC denotes the average level of cooperative behavior
on the spatial grid after the evolution of emotional profiles
has stopped, i.e. after the fixation of α and β. Since the
regions of α = 1 and β = 1 in the stag-hunt quadrant
overlap completely, it is natural that in this region also
the probability to encounter cooperation will be equal to
1. Comparing this to the results presented in Fig. 1, it
can be concluded that replacing the imitation of strategies
with the imitation of emotional profiles in the stag-hunt
game promotes cooperation by extending the ρC = 1 re-
gion towards larger values of T and smaller values of S.
For the snowdrift and the prisoner’s dilemma game full
dominance of cooperative behavior can be observed where
α = 1 and β = 1 regions overlap, while if α = 1 and
β = 0 the probability to encounter cooperative behavior
equals 0.5. Naturally, where both α and β are equal to
zero also ρC = 0. Altogether, by comparing results pre-
sented in Figs. 1 and 4, it can be concluded that imitating
emotional profiles, and thus having the liberty to behave
differently towards different players, instead of adopting
pure strategies, strongly promotes the evolution of cooper-
ation in all three considered spatial social dilemma games.
Particularly players engaging in the snowdrift game profit
immensely from the new imitation procedure, which is sur-
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Fig. 4: Color map depicting the final probability of cooper-
ative behavior ρC on the T − S parameter plane. Since the
probability to cooperate should be seen equal to the stationary
fraction of cooperators in the traditional version of the game, a
direct comparison of results presented in this figure and Fig. 1
clearly reveals that replacing the imitation of strategies with
the imitation of emotional profiles, as determined by α and
β, strongly promotes the evolution of cooperation in all three
considered spatial social dilemma games.
prising since especially for spatial games having a mixed
Nash equilibrium imitation has acquired quite a negative
reputation [30].
Since the success of imitation for spatial games where
the Nash equilibrium is a mixed phase (coexistence of co-
operators and defectors), as is the case for the snowdrift
game, has often been questioned, it is thus of interest to
examine results in this particular region of the T − S pa-
rameter plane more precisely. Foremost, it should be em-
phasized that fine-tuning the imitation (what to imitate)
procedure clearly restores the successfulness of imitation
to arrive at a final state that is optimal for the society as a
whole (see also results presented in Fig. 6 further below).
The snapshot depicted in the left panel of Fig. 5 presents
a typical final configuration of players, color-coded in such
a way that if the player behaves cooperatively more (less)
frequently than defectively toward its neighbors it is de-
picted green (red), while if the two actions are equally
frequent it is depicted yellow. The presented snapshot
reveals a characteristic checkerboard distribution of ex-
pected strategies, which is made even clearer by the en-
largement of a typical region of the spatial grid depicted
in the right panel of Fig. 5. Noteworthy, as a result of
the evolutionary process, and despite of diverse strategies,
players exhibit identical willingness to either cooperate or
to defect, i.e. are characterized by the same emotional
profile. This indicates that under the newly proposed imi-
tation procedure players indeed share roles of cooperation
and defection in order to arrive at the “socially optimal”
configuration. Put differently, the spatial arrangement of
players demonstrates that using the same attitude towards
more or less successful players may result in a spatial mix-
ture of cooperative and defective actions that warrants the
p-4
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Fig. 5: Left: Characteristic snapshot of the final configuration
of players engaging in the snowdrift game. Players are depicted
green if they cooperate more frequently than defect with their
neighbors, red if the opposite holds, and yellow if coopera-
tion and defection are equally frequent. Right: Enlargement
of a small portion of the spatial grid on the left (using the
same color coding), revealing the characteristic role-separating
checkerboard configuration of players, which warrants the high-
est mutual payoffs in the snowdrift game.
highest mutual payoff.
Finally, as the last, and perhaps most persuading ev-
idence for the successfulness of the newly proposed im-
itation procedure, it is thus instructive to examine the
difference in payoffs between the traditional version of
the games (results presented in Fig. 1) and the one in-
troduced here adopting imitation of emotional profiles in-
stead of strategies. Results presented in Fig. 6 reveal most
clearly the extent of cooperation promotion in the stag-
hunt quadrant (the black stripe in the lower left quadrant
corresponds accurately to the enlarged area of coopera-
tor dominance), as well as the transition towards the so-
cially optimal mixed C −D phase in large regions of the
snowdrift (upper right) quadrant. The prisoner’s dilemma
game, arguably constituting the most demanding condi-
tions for the evolution of cooperation, also presents itself
as very much susceptible to the positive impact of the
new imitation procedure, if only the sucker’s payoff is not
too negative. Note also that the difference in the harmony
quadrant and partly also in the stag-hunt quadrant is zero
because both models yield a full C phase. With these fi-
nal results, we conclude that imitating emotions such as
goodwill and envy instead of unconditionally copying pure
strategies from the more successful players reestablishes
imitation as perfectly suitable for resolving social dilem-
mas on structured populations, even for games where the
Nash equilibrium is a mixed phase.
Before concluding, we note that the dynamics of the
model proposed in this letter is significantly different from
the one emerging when the evolutionary process is gov-
erned by stochastic reactive strategies [26,37]. In the latter
case, the choice of action in a given round is only affected
by the opponent’s behavior in the previous round, and con-
sequently, a special form of reciprocity can emerge between
neighbors because a cooperative act will likely trigger a
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Fig. 6: Color map depicting the difference in average payoffs
∆p between the traditional version of the considered spatial
social dilemma games (results presented in Fig. 1) and the
new one adopting the imitation of emotional profiles instead
of strategies. It can be observed that all three considered so-
cial dilemma games are able to benefit substantially from the
updated form of imitation, increasing the social welfare by sig-
nificant margins if compared to the traditional form of evo-
lution that is governed by imitating player strategies. Quite
unexpectedly, the advantages of updated imitation are most
pronounced in the snowdrift quadrant (upper right), which due
to the fact that the Nash equilibrium is a mixed phase, should
be least susceptible to the benefits emerging as a result of im-
itation.
similar reaction (to cooperate) from the targeted player.
As we have argued, this is not necessarily true when emo-
tions are subject to imitation. The role-separating mixed
phase in the snowdrift quadrant has already been observed
in spatial games, but it needed a significantly different –
the so-called myopic strategy update – where a player can
change the strategy independently from its neighborhood
[38, 39]. Results presented here reveal that such a state
can evolve also by means of imitation. To highlight the
robustness of our findings, we have also applied the so-
called death-birth updating [40], but found very similar
results. Furthermore, the application of weak mutation,
allowing the emergence of independent (α, β) pairs, does
not interfere with the evolution towards unique emotion
profiles, as we have described above.
Summary. – In sum, we have proposed and studied
an alternative form of imitation, focusing specifically on
its impact on the evolution of cooperation in the three
most frequently considered spatial social dilemma games,
namely the spatial snowdrift, stag-hunt and the prisoner’s
dilemma game. By replacing the imitation of strategies
by the imitation of emotional profiles of players, as de-
fined by the probability to cooperate with the more and
less successful neighbors, we have found that players are
much more likely to cooperate with less successful neigh-
bors than they do with those who are more successful.
Thus, while goodwill and charity appear to be important
agonists facilitating the evolution of cooperation, envy and
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spite act detrimental, favoring the evolution of defection
instead. Importantly, this duality in the evolution of the
two emotional traits of players actually leads to rather un-
expected benefits in the snowdrift game, where the Nash
equilibrium is a mixed phase. Although imitation was
previously thought to be unsuitable for achieving the so-
cially optimal state in this type of spatial games, our re-
sults indicate that the limitations lie not in the act of
imitation itself, but rather in what is available for imi-
tation. By replacing the strategy with a slightly more
elaborate concept of an emotional profile, we have found
that imitation is fully capable of guiding the population
towards the globally optimal state warranting the high-
est level of social welfare. The stag-hunt as well as the
prisoner’s dilemma game are also susceptible to the pro-
motion of cooperation by means of the newly proposed
imitation procedure. But while in the stag-hunt game ben-
efits from both the cooperation with less as well as with
the more successful neighbors are attainable, in the pris-
oner’s dilemma game the positive impact on the evolution
of cooperation is (almost) entirely due to players being
willing to cooperate with their less successful neighbors.
Envy, being prohibitive to act cooperatively with more
successful neighbors, thus appears to be a major inhibitor
of higher levels of cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s
dilemma game. Altogether, we find that more elaborate
forms of imitation may reveal new mechanisms of promot-
ing the evolution of cooperation in ways that appear to be
more closely associated with complex societies, where the
strategies alone may carry insufficient information to fully
exploit the benefits of imitation.
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